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Apartheid in South Africa was formally discarded by the first free election in 1994, Prior to 1994 
discrimination in the labour market was embodied in a number of policies (pass laws, 
occupational colour barring etc.). While such polices may be eliminated by the ANC 
government, it is apparent that the elimination of racial wage discrimination altogether will be a 
lengthy process. 
In the present paper, racial wage discrimination is treated via a multilateral wage decomposition 
technique. Each observed wage differential is broken down into a productivity component and a 
discrimination component so that the extent of racial wage discrimination can be estimated. 
Using data collected just before (1993) and just after (1995) the first democratic election, it can 
be concluded that previous findings of long-term declining discrimination are reversed in the 











o Executive Summary 
Several studies focusing on racial discrimination in the South African labour market have been 
conducted. Different approaches have been used, but the major fmdings have been similar. 
Knight and McGrath (1987) found that discrimination against Africans (blacks) decreased by 50 
per cent between 1976 and 1985. Work done by Moll (1998) and Hinks (1999) using data from 
1980 and 1993, and 1980 and 1994, respectively, further led to the conclusion that racial wage 
discrimination was declining in South Africa. However, discrimination studies using post 
apartheid data cannot conclude that the previous decline in discrimination is continuing. Based 
on data from 1995 and 1997 Hinks and Allanson (2000) find discriminatory patterns to vary 
among racial groups. 
The present paper focuses on wage discrimination for full-time employees. Such discrimination 
is estimated by decomposing differences in mean wages of South Africa's four racial groups, into 
a productivity component and a discrimination component. Following this approach, 
discrimination is defined as unequal pay for similar work. Other discriminatory factors, such as 
occupational barriers and differing access to education and quality of education, are at best 
controlled for. Some of these factors are difficult to quantify and are not my primary concern, 
since I primarily focus on discrimination within the labour market. 
Section 2 of the paper provides a review of major developments in the methodology of 
estimating discrimination based on wage differentials. The point of departure is Oaxaca's 
(1973A) decomposition ofa wage differential into a productivity component and a 
discrimination component. Possible estimation methods of different wage decompositions are 
also discussed. Next, following Neumark (1988), it is shown how different wage decompositions 
link to the theory of employer discrimination. 
Section 3 describes the specification ofthe earnings functions, which enable estimation of 
discrimination coefficients. Using ordinary least squares, the natural logarithm of earnings is 
estimated as a function of a range of individual characteristics, viz: years of education; potential 
work experience; rural versus urban residency; union membership versus non-membership; 
industry; occupation; and province of residence. 
The data used in the analysis are drawn from the 1993 Southern Africa Labour and Development 
Research Unit (SALDRU) Household Survey (SALDRU93) and the 1995 October Household 
Survey (OHS95), conducted by Statistics South Africa (then the Central Statistical Services). 
Using data collected just before and just after the formal demise of apartheid, it is hoped that 
additional insight into changes in the nature and magnitude of discrimination may be provided. 
The methodology is applied to males and females separately, so as not to introduce gender bias 
into the estimates. 
A number of important assumptions and restrictions underlie the results. Firstly, the focus is on 
discrimination among full time wage earning employees. Other forms of discrimination, labelled 
pre-labour market discrimination, have at best been controlled for (e.g. dummy variables for 
occupational categories) and at worst not controlled for owing to lack of data (e.g. quality of 
education). Secondly, the decomposition method estimates discrimination as the residual 
difference between observed wage differentials and the wage component explained by 











the discrimination estimates. Thirdly, a more fundamental assumption is that the presence of 
discrimination has only distributional effects. In other words, the wage bill is regarded as 
constant whether discrimination is present or not. Fourthly, to make discrimination estimates 
operational, one needs a notion of what the wage structure would be like in the absence of 
discrimination. This paper uses average characteristics based on a pooled sample containing all 
racial groups as a proxy for the non-discriminatory wage structure. Lastly, certain ad hoc 
assumptions were unavoidable when attempting to make data from 1993 congruent with data 
from 1995. 
The major findings can be summarised as follows. African males were subject to discrimination 
in the form of underpayment in both 1993 and 1995. However, the largest share of the observed 
wage differential between this group's average wage and the average wage of all workers was 
due to below average productivity characteristics. For Coloured and Asian males, substantial 
wage differentials were mostly explained by above or below average productivity characteristics 
(again relative to the average male worker). An exception was found for Asian males in 1995, 
where above average productivity characteristics accounted for some 78 per cent of the observed 
wage differential. Based on discrimination coefficients, it was found that discrimination was 
most remarkable towards white males. Whites are overpaid, illustrated by the fact that in 1993 
and 1995, productivity characteristics could only explain approximately 65 per cent and 54 per 
cent of the observed wage differential, respectively. 
Among females, discrimination exhibits similar patterns as for males. Differing productivity 
compared to the average female worker explains by far the largest proportion of the observed 
wage differentials for Africans, Coloureds and Asians. But productivity as the explanatory force, 
is not as predominant among Africans as among Coloureds and Asians. The results for Asian 
females in 1995 are an exception. In 1995 productivity accounted for only 62 per cent of the 
(average) wage differential between Asian females and all females. Again, the data suggest that 
the most striking discriminatory effect is defined by White overpayment. For White females, 
above average productivity characteristics account for 71 per cent and 66 per cent of the wage 
differential in 1993 and 1995, respectively. 
In sum, using data from 1993 and 1995, variation in discrimination trends among racial groups 
seems to be the rule. At the least, I cannot conclude that discrimination is declining as an overall 
trend for all racial groups. But what do the differences when comparing the 1993 results with the 
1995 results really reflect? Two possible explanations seem plausible: the differences reflect 
either changes over time or data inconsistencies. If the time span of two years is too short to pick 
up considerable changes in the underlying wage structure, then variation in discriminatory trends 
probably reflects data inconsistencies. A more likely scenario is that changing discrimination 
coefficients incorporate both changes over time and problems with the data. Unfortunately, it is 
not clear how to separate these effects. Despite these problems, one finding stands out, namely 
that Whites are overpaid relative to their measured productivity. However, some of this effect 
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In 1980 the geometric mean wage of full time working South African males was R245 per month 
(Hinks 1999). In 1995 the geometric mean monthly wage had increased to R1305 per month. 
However, mean wages varied significantly among South Africa's racial groups. As an 
illustration, the mean African wage was 48 per cent below the all-male average in 1980 and 37 
per cent below the all-male average in 1995. Whites, on the other hand, received mean wages 
203 per cent above the all-male average in 1980 and 296 per cent more than the all-male average 
in 1995. Large wage differences between races are thus clearly predominant in South Africa, 
both in 1980 and 1995. 
How can such wage differences be explained? 
According to economic theory workers should be paid according to their productivity. Differing 
productivity characteristics among racial groups could therefore serve as an explanation for 
observed wage differences. However, can productivity characteristics fully explain observed 
wage differences? A number of studies (Oaxaca 1973A, Oaxaca and Ransom 1988, Cotton 1988, 
Neumark 1988, Hinks 1999) conclude that productivity accounts for parts of observed wage 
differences only, leaving discrimination as a possible explanation for the remaining parts.Labour 
market discrimination may thus be defined as present if workers having identical productivity 
characteristics in a physical or material sense are paid differently owing to some exterior 
characteristic (e.g. race, gender, union membership etc). 
This paper focuses on wage discrimination among races in the South African labour market for 
full time employees. Several other studies concerning the same topic have been conducted. These 
studies have differed in their approach to discrimination, but the major findings have been 
similar. Knight and McGrath (1987) found that discrimination against Africans (blacks) 
decreased by 50 per cent between 1976 and 1985. Work done by Moll (1998) and Hinks (1999) 
using data from 1980 and 1993, and 1980 and 1994, respectively, concluded with the finding that 
racial wage discrimination was declining in South Africa. However, discrimination studies using 
post apartheid data cannot conclude that the previous decline in discrimination is continuing. 
Based on data from 1995 and 1997 Hinks and Allanson (2000) find discriminatory patterns to 
vary among racial groups. 
But why this interest in discrimination? 
Firstly, most people agree that workers having identical productivity characteristics and doing the 
same job, but being paid differently, is unjustifiable. The slogan "equal pay for equal work" 
seems fair to most people. In an economic sense discrimination attracts interest beyond the 
fairness perspective. Economic theories of discrimination predict welfare losses associated with 
any form of discrimination in the labour market (Sapsford and Tzannatos 1993). The implication 
of welfare losses from discrimination is illustrated in the following example (ibid.). 
Assume that the labour market consists of two producers (I and II) and two labour groups (K and 
L). The two producers have identical technology, produce the same good and use labour as the 
only input in production. The two groups of workers, K and L, are equally productive. Further, it 
is imposed that initially the labour market is completely segregated, meaning that producer I 
employs only K workers, while producer II employs only L workers. Lastly, the labour supply is 
completely inelastic and identical for both groups of employees. Producers pay wages equalling 











identical in the two segments ofthe labour market, group K and L workers receive identical 
wages. In Figure 1 equal wages for both K and L workers are illustrated by W; = WL*' To analyse 
the effects of discrimination, an arbitrary higher wage for K workers (W; W;) is imposed. The 
implication of discrimination is thus to increase the wage for a certain group of workers. Higher 
wages, in the labour market for producer I, imply that fewer workers are employed. To maintain 
full employment, the displaced K workers have to seek employment from producer IT. The 
increased supply of labour facing producer IT decreases wages for all L workers and the displaced 
K workers. K workers who are still employed by producer I are therefore better offwith 
discrimination, while L workers and displaced K workers are worse off. 
In addition to the redistributional effects of discrimination, Figure 1 may be used to examine 
welfare effects. Reduced employment by producer I gives a net reduction in welfare, illustrated 
by the trapezoid A+C+B. However, increased employment by producer IT gives an increase in 
welfare, illustrated by the area A+B. Area C is thus a net welfare loss induced by discrimination. 
Although the same number of workers are employed, inefficiencies are created since displaced K 
workers are less productive when employed by producer IT in addition to the original L workers. 
wd K 
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Having argued that discrimination creates welfare losses it is not surprising that economists have 
been preoccupied with analyses of discrimination. As far back as 1922 Edgeworth analysed 
discrimination between genders. However, Becker presented a more comprehensive treatment of 
discrimination in 1957. According to Becker (1971), the cause of discrimination is individuals 
having a "taste for discrimination." Furthermore, discrimination occurs only when individuals act 
according to their tastes, e.g. in the form of direct payments or reduced income, in order to be 
associated with workers from certain groups. Becker defines three types of discrimination rooted 












When employer discrimination is present, the employer's decisions involve a tradeoff between 
profits and the ratio of workers from different groups. If an employer dislikes group L workers, 
his utility increases as the ratio of L workers decreases. Employers are thus willing to forfeit 
profits in order to employ a low ratio of employees from disliked groups. In other words, 
employer discrimination implies that preferred groups receive higher wages than in a situation 
with no discrimination, while disliked groups are paid less. 1 
The same conclusion can be reached based on slightly different assumptions. Instead of 
employers having tastes for discrimination one can define employees to have tastes for different 
groups of co-workers. If a certain type of employee, e.g. foremen, have preferences over co-
workers from different groups (race, gender, union etc), then foremen's decisions to take 
employment is influenced by a trade-off between the wage and the ratio of co-workers from 
different groups. A rational firm takes their foremen's preferences into account and profits by 
offering higher wages to workers who are preferred by foremen, since the cost of hiring foremen 
thereby is reduced. Again, employees from disliked groups are paid less than in a situation with 
no discrimination, while workers from groups preferred by foremen are better paid. 
Finally, consumer discrimination is present if consumers are willing to pay higher prices to 
purchase goods produced by specific groups of workers. 
Although tastes for discrimination, within a neoclassical framework, lead to plausible 
explanations for discriminatory behaviour, some major objections persist. In the case of employer 
discrimination, a long run argument for discrimination is hard to maintain. In the long run capital 
is flexible and will be attracted by the most profitable firms. The most discriminatory employers, 
who are willing to forfeit the most profit in order to keep the relative number of workers from 
certain groups low, will thus be the least profitable and have the smallest market shares. 
Moreover, if non-discriminating firms exist, then these are the only firms that will survive in the 
long run. Neoclassical models for employer discrimination therefore predict the end of 
discrimination in the long run. Following Arrow (1973B), the model of employer discrimination 
predicts the absence (in the long run) ofthe phenomenon it was designed to explain. However, 
by introducing costs of adjusting the ratio of workers (the cost of hiring and firing) from different 
groups, it might be profitable to keep the ratio of workers fixed given a marginal change in 
wages. In other words, it can be profitable not to change the ratio of employees from different 
groups, and discriminatory firms might survive even in the long run. 
Apart from the long term implications of models based on tastes for discrimination, it can be 
argued that such models are of little value since the source of discrimination, namely the tastes, 
are unexplained. The tastes for discrimination are exogenous in the models and are therefore not 
analysed. Arrow (1973A) offers an alternative source of discrimination, namely the "perception 
of reality." If employers believe that group K workers are more productive than L workers, the 
latter will only be employed if WL < WK. If Arrow's notion of "perceptions" is to add additional 
insight, an explanation of how the "perceptions" are formed has to be given. One possible 
explanation is that if individuals act in a discriminatory fashion, they tend to develop beliefs 
which justify their actions (Marsha111974). However, beliefs based on the perception of reality 
will not persist, if proven wrong in reality. 
'Only relative discrimination matters. If an employer dislikes L workers, workers from other groups are being 
preferred relatively speaking. Relative discrimination applies to wages as well. If L workers are underpaid due to 











There are a number of other approaches to the theory of discrimination. One example is 
Marshall's (ibid.) bargaining model "which incorporates features of the neoclassical models but 
specifies the motives of the various actors and the contexts within which they operate on the 
basis of empirical evidence rather than a priori deductive reasoning. " A problem with models 
based on empirical evidence is that they tend to become quite complex and fail to produce 
general results. Hence neoclassical models, as described above, have an advantage in their 
general form and straightforward predictions. That might be the reason why such models are a 
key reference in much work addressing discrimination, including this paper. 
Given the existence of discrimination, how can it be measured? 
If observed wage differentials are decomposed into a productivity component and a 
discrimination component, one way of measuring discrimination is as the residual between the 
wage differential and the estimated productivity component. 
This paper addresses how decomposition techniques can be utilised in order to measure 
discrimination. Once the approach is established, it will be applied to full time employees in the 
South African labour market. Since discrimination is analysed only for full time employees and 
is measured by a residual approach, some initial remarks concerning the interpretation of 
discrimination are in order. 
Using decomposition techniques, discrimination is defined as unequal pay for similar work. 
Having said this, wage discrimination should not be interpreted as workers from different groups 
having the same occupation, identical jobs and working for the same employer, but being paid 
differently. Discrimination rather reflects different pay to workers falling under the same 
occupational categories, working for different employers, etc. Moreover, only discrimination 
within the labour market is addressed, meaning that other discriminatory factors such as the 
quality of and access to education are not controlled for. The occupational distribution is 
controlled for by using dummy variables. Access to education is defined as pre-labour market 
discrimination, meaning that once within the workforce employees are not paid differently due to 
original differing access to education. Accounting for the quality of education is more 
complicated since the quality of education directly affects employees' productivity. 
Unfortunately no information potentially describing the quality of education was available and 
the impact of the quality of education is thus omitted. Since discrimination is estimated as a 
residual, it is crucial that all factors that have an impact on productivity are accounted for. 
However, in empirical work, accounting for all productivity factors is at best extremely costly 
and difficult, and at worst impossible. This is important to keep in mind since the discrimination 
coefficient, measured by the residual between the wage differential and the productivity 
component, captures both the effects of discrimination and unobserved group differences (e.g. 
the quality of education) in productivity and tastes (Altonji and Blank 1999). 
The empirical work is based on data from 1993 and 1995. Using data collected just before and 
just after the fall of apartheid, it is hoped that additional insight into changes in and the 
magnitude of discrimination may be provided. 
Section 2 ofthe paper provides a review of major developments in the methodology of 
estimating discrimination based on wage differentials. The point of departure is Oaxaca's 
(1973A) decomposition of a wage differential into a productivity component and a 











also discussed.Next, following Neumark (1988), it is shown how different wage decompositions 
link to the theory of employer discrimination. 
Section 3 describes the specification ofthe earnings functions, which enable estimation of 
discrimination coefficients. Using ordinary least squares, the natural logarithm of earnings is 
estimated as a function of a range of individual characteristics, viz: years of education; potential 
work experience; rural versus urban residency; union membership versus non-membership; 
industry; occupation; and province of residence. 











2 Review of the Wage Differential Methodology 
2. 1 Decomposition theory 
Economic work concerning wage discrimination has focused on decomposing wage differentials 
into two components, namely a productivity component and a discrimination component. Since 
Oaxaca's (1973A) pioneering study of gender discrimination in the United States labour market, 
the methodology concerning discrimination based on wage differences has evolved considerably. 
A review of the main developments on how to handle decomposition between two groups and 
also how researchers deal with multilateral comparisons is given below. In the literature 
explanations of how to derive the desired decomposition equation are generally rather brief. This 
review will be more thorough in an attempt to make it easier to follow the various steps of the 
mathematical derivations. The original contributors to the methodology included Oaxaca 
(l973A), Neumark (1988), Cotton (1988), Oaxaca and Ransom (1988 and 1994) and Hinks 
(1999). 
The gross (unadjusted) wage differential 
The observed or actual wage differential G is interchangeably defined as 
G Wk-~ G l_ Wk2 kl ¢::> kl + - -=- , 
~ ~ 
(1) 
where k and I represent groups or categories within a chosen qualitative variable (e.g. racial 
groups, genders, union members versus non-members, etc.), Wk,l is the geometric mean wage of 
the various groups, and G gives the relative difference between the mean wage of groups k and 1. 
Applying a logarithmic transfonnation to (1) one obtains 
(2) 
This fonnat is particularly useful given the standard semi-logarithmic fonn of the earnings 
function regression equation. 
The productivity differential 
Assuming that labour would be paid their marginal productivity in the absence of discrimination 
we have: 
Wk




where the superscript 0 refers to the absence of discrimination. This allows us to define the 
productivity differential interchangeably as 
2 -
Mean wages are computed as geometric means defined as: W 
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kl - MP, 
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(4) 
Again, sUbscripts refer to groups, while Q gives the relative difference between mean wages of 
different groups if employees were paid the non-discriminatory wage. In other words, Q 
represents the earnings differential attributable solely to differences in (mean) productivity 
between the groups k and 1. 
In logarithmic form (4) becomes 
W - -0 (-OJ In(Qk/ + 1) In ~o = In(Wk 0 ) -In(W; ). (5) 
The market discrimination coefficient 
Given the gross wage differential and the productivity differential the market discrimination 
coefficient is defined as the relative difference between the actual mean wage difference and the 
mean wage difference in the absence of discrimination: 
( ~/W; J Dkl + 1 0/' 0' Wk W; (6) 
In logarithmic form (6) becomes 
( ~/W; \j' (Wk: (WkoJ In(Dk[ + 1) In 0/ 0 In -=- In -0 . Wk W; W; W; 
(7) 
Inserting (2) and (5) into (7) and rearranging we obtain 
In(Gkl + 1):::: In(Qkl + 1) + In(Dk/ + 1) . (8) 
Equation (8) gives the traditional decomposition of the logarithmic mean wage differential into a 
productivity component (In(Qkl + 1») and a discrimination component (In(Dkl + 1) ) (Oaxaca and 
Ransom 1994). According to this decomposition, discrimination takes the form of one group 
being either over- or underpaid. Assume group k is overpaid. Group I now has nothing to gain 
from discrimination vanishing, since the absence of discrimination only implies reduced wages 
for group k. Assume instead that discrimination materialises in group 1 being underpaid. In the 
absence of discrimination group I wages would increase. Group k wages would remain 
unchanged, since discrimination defined by equation (8) restricts discrimination to either over- or 
underpayment (Cotton 1998). In both scenarios only one group is affected if discrimination 
should disappear. This argument is valid only if total actual output or the total wage bill remains 
unaltered in the absence of discrimination. Equation (8) is thus implicitly based on an assumption 











(ibid.). Discrimination defined solely as over- or underpayment, originally used by Oaxaca 
(1973A), has more recently been recognised as overly restrictive. 
Arguing that both groups would be affected by the removal of discrimination leads to a further 
decomposition of equation (8). Discrimination can now be attributed to both over- and 
underpayments, relative to a non-discriminatory wage. One group receives above the non-
discriminatory wage, benefiting from the other group being paid less than the non-discriminatory 
wage. 
From (7) we have 
Therefore we can write 
In(Dk, + 1) = In(ok + 1) In(o[ + 1), (9) 
where 




0; is the differential between the current mean wage of group i, and the mean wage of the same 
group in the absence of discrimination. If 0; ~ 0 then In(o; + l)can be interpreted as the group i 
wage advantage. If 0, sO then In(oi + 1) is interpreted as the group i wage disadvantage. From 
(9) we see that discrimination can be separated into a wage advantage (In(oj + 1), when 5, ~ 0) 
and a wage disadvantage (In(o; + 1), when 5; s 0).3 
Inserting (9) into (8) yields 
In(Gkl +1) = In(Qkl +1) + [In(ok +1)-ln(o[ +1)]. (11) 
Equation (11) gives an expanded decomposition where the discrimination component is broken 
down into overpayment (In(5k + 1» and underpayment (In(5j + 1). Estimations according to 
(11) have dominated the literature, whether the focus has been on unions (Oaxaca and Ransom 
1988), gender (Neumark 1988) or race (Cotton 1988, Oaxaca and Ransom 1994). 











A limitation of the methodology described thus far is that it handles comparisons between only 
two groups at the time. Hinks (1999) describes a method that allows comparisons of several 
groups against a pooled non-discriminatory wage structure. Following this approach it can be 
detennined whether each of the different groups is favoured or discriminated against. 
Using (2) and defining Was the mean wage in the labour market as a whole, we can write 
[
-\ 
In(Gk, + 1) = In ~) = In(Wk )-In(W,)+ InW -lnW 
= In(Yk + J) -In(r, + 1), 
where 
ri = -1, i = k, 1. 
ri is the differential between the mean wage of group i relative to the mean wage of all 
employees (i.e. all groups combined). 
(12) 
(13) 
In similar fashion, we define W 0 as the non-discriminatory mean wage for the whole labour 
force and rewrite (5) as 
where 
-0 
Bj = W, 0 -1 , i == k, L 
W 
= In(Bk + 1) -In(B, + 1), (14) 
(15) 
()i is the differential between the mean wage of group i in the absence of discrimination and the 
non-discriminatory wage of the entire workforce. 












The decomposition given by (16) has the advantage that each component is defined relative to 
the entire workforce and is thus independent of a comparison between two specific groups of 
workers (e.g Whites versus Blacks). 
If (16) is manipulated slightly this point becomes clearer. Let k = g, where g is equal to the 
different groups ofthe population (e.g. African, Coloured, Asian and White) and let 1 = R, where 
R represents the entire workforce (i.e. all four groups combined). 
Then we have 
(
w ') - -
In(r H + 1) = In H I = In W - In W = 0, 
W; 
Therefore, assuming that the current mean wage of the population equals the mean wage in the 
absence of discrimination (i.e. WH = Wf~)' we see that equation (16) reduces to 
In(r g + 1) == In(Bg + 1) + In(og + 1). (17) 
From (17) it is obvious that Rinks' decomposition compares the individual group g to the entire 
workforce. In other words decompositions following Rinks' approach define discrimination of a 
group g relative to the mean wage ofthe whole workforce. 
2.2 Estimation of discrimination coefficients 
To make any ofthe decompositions suggested by (8), (11) or (17) operational one needs to make 
certain assumptions concerning what the wage structure would be in the absence of 
discrimination (which can also be interpreted as the competitive wage structure). 
Common to all approaches is that estimations are based on earnings functions of the form 
(18) 
where g refers to group g and i to individual i in group g. 
Equation (18) relates the natural logarithm of the wage for a specific group to a vector of 
individual characteristics (both quantitative and qualitative), Xgi, and a disturbance term, u 
(which is assumed to have Gauss-Markov properties). fJg is a vector of coefficients. (In Rinks' 











Equation (18) can be estimated by 
A 
I ~ 
(InWgi )=X giPg , (19) 
Further, the estimate of the natural logarithm ofa group's mean wage is given by 
(20) 
Wg is the estimated geometric mean wage of group g. X~ is a vector of mean characteristics for 
group g, and Pg a vector consisting of the estimated coefficients from the earnings function 
given by (19). 
Using (20), equation (2) can then be estimated by 
(21) 
If one assumes that discrimination takes the form of one group being under- or overpaid while 
the other group receives the non-discriminatory wage, then equation (8) can be estimated by 
applying (22a) or (22b) which follow. 
Firstly, assume group k is overpaid. In the absence of discrimination this group would thus 
receive the same wage as group 1. Hence the group I wage is interpreted as the non-
discriminatory wage in this case. 
A 
~~H+n=~A ~A=~A-~A+~A-~A 
= (X~ - )PI +X;CPk - PI) (22a) 
Related to equation (8), the productivity component of the wage differential is reflected by 
(X~ - X;)PI and the discrimination component by X; (Pk - PI)' 
When estimating discrimination the observed differences in sample mean wages are normally 
used rather than trying to estimate wage differences, i.e. based on (22a). Using sample mean 
wages imply that only the productivity component is estimated. The discrimination component is 
then derived taking the difference between the log of the wage differential and the estimated 
productivity component. This is illustrated in the equation below. 
In(DH + 1) In(Gkl + 1) (X~ - X;)P, , where Gk, is the sample wage differential. 
Assume instead that group I is underpaid. Now discrimination implies that group I would be paid 
the same as group k in the absence of discrimination. 











In(Gk/ + 1) X~Pk - X;p/ = X~Pk X;p/ + X;Pk - X;Pk 
(X~ - X; )Pk + Xl (Pk - PI) 
Again, discrimination estimates are derived from an equation as 
(22b) 
If one prefers the notion that discrimination results in one group being overpaid by subsidisation 
from an underpaid group, then estimation along the line of equation (11) can be expressed as 
P' refers to a vector of coefficients describing the non-discriminatory wage structure. 
P' may be defined as 
(23) 
(24) 
The coefficients describing the non-discriminatory wage structure of the whole workforce are 
therefore some (linear) combination of the coefficients for the different groups of workers. Since, 
Pi (i =k, 1), is estimated from the earnings functions, an estimation of J3' becomes a question of 
how to determine ¢. 
If ¢ takes either the value 0 or 1, we see that (23) reduces itself to (22a) or (22b). So the 
assumption of one group being either over- or underpaid, as made by Oaxaca (1973A), is a 
special case of the more general specification given by (23). Cotton (1988) suggests that the 
fraction of the entire sample that each group constitutes should be used as estimators for ¢ and 
(1- ¢) . This weighting is based on a number of assumptions. First, one group is paid more than 
what the wage would be in the absence of discrimination and the other group less. Second, J3' is 
a strict linear combination of the groups' wage structures (J3k' J31 ). These assumptions imply that 
¢ E (0,1), and that the non-discriminatory wage structure will be closer to the current majority 
group's wage structure.s Mathematically, 
K 
K+L' 
where K and L are the sample sizes of the respective groups. 
(25) 
Another, more general, weighting scheme is suggested by Oaxaca and Ransom (1994). Here a 
row vector of coefficients describing the non-discriminatory wage structure is defined as 
SCotton does an analysis based on race in the US (for males only). In this case white workers are favoured by 
discrimination and whites are also the majority group in the workforce. Thus the non-discriminatory wage structure 
is closest to the white wage structure. But if the group disfavoured by discrimination constitutes the majority of the 












where <D is defined as 
(27) 
x p refers to a vector of mean characteristics for a pooled sample including all individual groups. 
Neumark (1988) shows how P" can be estimated as the set of coefficients from a least squares 
regression based on a pooled sample containing all groups. By substituting p'* for p*, equation 
(23) still holds, but now with a different interpretation of the coefficients describing the non-
discriminatory wage structure. 
If a multilateral decomposition is desired, estimates of the different components of equation (17) 
are given by (Rinks 1999) 
~ " " 
In(rg + 1) = InWg -lnW = X~Pg -X'p, (28) 
A ~ A 
In (B g + 1) = In Wg 0 -In W 0 = (X g - X)' P and (29) 
~ " ~ 
In(8g + 1) = lnWg -lnWgO = '(Pg - P). (30) 
Again, g represents the particular group in question, and P is a vector of coefficients describing 
the non-discriminatory wage structure. P is estimated by a least squares regression on a (pooled) 
sample containing all groupS.6 
If sample mean wages are utilised rather than estimating mean wages, the discrimination 
component in equation (17) can be estimated following 
In( 8 g + 1) = In(r g + 1) - (X g - X)' P , where r g is the sample mean wage differential. 
2.3 Decomposition's foundation in discrimination theory 
As shown in the previous section, to render any decomposition operational certain assumptions 
concerning the non-discriminatory wage structure have to be made. Since any estimation results 
hinge on these assumptions it is natural to explore how well they are rooted in theory. The 
following section is based on Neumark (1988), which again is based on Becker and Arrow. 
6Again we can show that In(rk + 1)-lnCr, + 1) = In(Bk + l)-In(B, + 1)+ In (8k + I)-In(8, + 1) 
is reduced to In(r g + 1) = In(Bg + 1)+ In(8g + 1) by letting k = g where g is a sample group, letting I H where 
H denotes the pooled sample, and assuming that W = WO • The last assumption implies that the estimated mean 











Using a model of employer discrimination the link between employers' discriminatory tastes 
and the definition ofthe competitive wage (non-discriminatory wage) is established. 
In the following model the economy consists of identical finns. The finns produce Y with labour 
as the only input. There are two types of labour, A and B (e.g. skilled and unskilled). Within each 
type oflabour there are two groups of workers, K and L (e.g. gender, race, union membership 
etc). The two groups of workers are perfect substitutes in production. Without discrimination 
workers would be paid a wage equal to their marginal product of labour. 
for type A workers and 
for type B workers. 
Productivity can thus differ between types of workers, but is assumed identical for a certain type 
of worker (e.g. skilled). Further we assume a strictly concave production function and fixed 
supply oflabour (full employment). 
Production can then be described as: 
A=KA +LA 
B=KB +LB 
Y=f(A,B)=f[(KA +LJ,(KB +LB)] 





Equations (31) and (32) indicate that the supply of different types of labour is completely 
inelastic, while (33) defines the production function and (34) expresses the finn's profit when the 
product price is numeraire. 
Since we allow employers to have preferences over groups o flab our they maximise not profits 
alone, but a strictly concave utility function where profit is an argument together with two types 
of employees (A, B) belonging to two different groups (K, L). 
where au >0 an - , au >0 aK - , 
B 
au <0 aL - , 
A 
(35) 
When the marginal utility of a group of workers is positive they are subj ect to nepotism, and 
when it is negative the group of workers is disfavoured. In the model it is imposed that group K 
workers are subject to nepotism and that group L workers are disfavoured. 
7 WijQ is the competitive wage of type j workers from group i. 
MPij is the marginal product of type j workers from group i. 
j=A,B 
i=K,L 
8 Relatively speaking, discrimination is present as long as either the marginal utility of both types ofK workers or L 
workers is different from zero. When restrictions are placed on all the marginal utilities, this is to enable the links to 











Optimal behaviour of the employer is given by 
max n.KA,LA,KBJ.B {U (n, K A' LA' K B' L B } 
The first order conditions are then given bl 
au on + au = 0 ~ 
an aKA aKA 
aU(af(A,B) WKA)+ au =0 and 
on aKA aKA 
~u(af(A,B) W )+ au =0. 
an oL LA oL A A 
Equivalent conditions hold for type B workers (unskilled). 
Using rearrangements of (36a) and (36b) we can define 
d =_ aU/aKA 






d KA ' d LA ' can be interpreted as discrimination coefficients (or the difference between marginal 
productivity and the wage rate). If d Kj < 0 (marginal utility of group K workers is positive) group 
K workers are subject to nepotism. If d Lj > 0 group L workers are disfavoured. Substituting from 
equation (37) into (36a) and (36b) gives 
F or type A workers 
W - of (A ,B) d KA KA- oK 
A 
of (A, B) W -,-_····--d 
LA - oL LA 
A 
For type B workers 
W _§[(A,B) d 
KB- oK KB 
B 
W _of (A, B) d 
LB - aLB LB 
, where sInce (38a) 
, where SInce (38b) 
, where SInce (38c) 
, where SInce (38d) 
au 
9 To make the fIrst order conditions complete we should include - 0, which is equivalent to the fIrst order 
on 












From (38a)-(38d) we see that the favoured group (K) of workers is paid at least their marginal 
product while the disfavoured group (L) gets paid at most their marginal product. 
For type A workers (since the marginal productivities ofKA and LA are assumed equal) 
(39a) 
For type B workers (since the marginal productivities ofKs and Ls are assumed equal) 
(39b) 
The model of employer discrimination has established a framework that enables linking the 
theory of discrimination to various ways of decomposing wage differences. 
Let us first assume that there is no nepotism. Given the model this implies that d KA = d KB 0 
and d LA ,d LB ~ O. (At least one ofthe discrimination coefficients for group L workers must be 
strictly greater than zero. Ifnot there is no discrimination.) From (38a) and (38c) we see that 
group K workers will be paid their marginal product, while L workers will be paid less than their 
marginal product. The discriminatory wage structure therefore pays group K workers according 
to their productivity, while group L workers are paid less then they are worth. In the absence of 
discrimination group K will retain their discriminatory wage while group L workers will receive 
a higher wage than with discrimination present. This situation maps to the wage decomposition 
where discrimination takes the fonn of one group being underpaid (see Equation (22b)). 
Let employer discrimination be characterised by nepotism towards group K only. Then 
d LA = d LB 0 and d KA' d KB :$ O. Now group L workers will be paid their marginal product, 
while K workers will receive a wage in excess of their marginal productivity. In the absence of 
discrimination wages for group L workers would be unaltered while group K workers would be 
paid less. This scenario maps to the wage decomposition where discrimination is characterised 
by one group being overpaid (see equation (22a)). 
When employer discrimination takes the fonn of either nepotism or disfavourism, a hypothetical 
elimination of discrimination, and the introduction of a competitive wage, will alter the received 
wage for only one group. 
Perhaps the most interesting case is when we allow employer discrimination to take the fonn of 
both nepotism and disfavourism simultaneously. In other words, given the presence of both 
nepotism and disfavourism, one might ask what the wage structure would be like if 
discrimination should disappear? For further discussion to be meaningful an additional 
restriction on the utility function is imposed. It is assumed that the utility function is homogenous 
of degree zero within each type oflabour. 1O The intuition behind this restriction is that employers 
are concerned only about the ratio of worker groups within each type oflabour; the absolute 











Since the utility function is homogenous of degree zero it follows from Euler's rule (Sydsreter, 
Stmm and Berck 1999) that 
and 
au K + au L =0. 
aK B aL B 
B B 





af(A,B) W j\K +(af(A,B) _ W )L = 0 ~ af(A,B) = WKAKA + WLAL A = Wo (41a) 
aA KA A aA LA A aA K + L A 
A A 
(
af(A,B) -w lK +(af(A,B) -W )L =0 ~ 8f(A,B) 
aB KB) B aB LB B aB 
Again the notation is simplified by noting that the marginal productivities ofKA and LA are 
assumed to be equal (and thus A can represent either), and similiarly for KB and LB.The wage 
received in the absence of discrimination is a weighted average of the wages received with 
employer discrimination present. This holds for both types of labour. The competitive wage of 
the group facing nepotism would thus be lower in the absence of employer discrimination and the 
wage of the disfavoured group would be higher. This interpretation of discrimination maps to 
wage decompositions where the current wage structure is described by both over- and under-











3 Data Used and the Determination of Earnings Functions 
3.1 Data 
The data for the empirical analysis are derived from the 1993 Southern Africa Labour and 
Development Research Unit (SALDRU) Household Survey (SALDRU93) and the 1995 October 
Household Survey (OHS95). 
SALDRU93 was a comprehensive household survey of the entire South African population 
(former TBVC states were also included). The survey was of a two-stage self-weighting design. 
First 360 clusters (enumerated areas) were determined and next 25 households from each cluster 
were surveyed. Thus some 9000 households were questioned and with an average of 5 persons 
per household the sample consists of approximately 45 000 individuals. 
The October Household Survey has been conducted annually by Statistics South Africa since 
1993, but 1994 was the first year in which a sample representative of the whole population was 
defined. The OHS95 survey was stratified based on provinces. Then 3000 enumerated areas were 
defined and next 10 households were questioned from each enumerated area. Thus some 30 000 
households were surveyed in OHS95. Assuming an average of 5 persons per household, 
approximately 150000 individuals were surveyed in the OHS95. 
3.2 Sample Definition 
Discrimination is estimated as the residual between the observed wage differential and the wage 
component explained by productivity characteristics. Since discrimination is analysed among full 
time employees, factors not addressing different pay for equal work are excluded. This implies 
that factors such as quality of education, the nature of experience and occupational barriers are 
treated as pre-labour market discrimination. This is not to insinuate that such factors are 
unimportant, but they are very difficult to quantify. The issue of discrimination in access to 
occupations is addressed through the use of dummy variables, while I have not controlled for 
quality of education. Females are treated separately so as not to induce gender bias into the 
discrimination estimates. Further, the focus is on regular wage employment. To capture the 
labour force an age restriction ranging from 15 to 64 is imposed. Moreover, self employed, 
casual workers, not currently employed workers and workers with non-positive wages are 
omitted from the sample. Employees with non-positive figures reported for hours worked last 
week are also excluded. Finally, observations with missing data on any variable included in the 
earnings functions, were disregarded. The samples then consist of regular, wage earning 
employees between 15 and 64 years of age. Given the described restrictions the sample size was 
reduced to 2223 male and 1570 female observations in 1993 and 11 727 male and 5822 female 
observations in 1995. 
3.3 Earnings Functions 
Utilising the residual as the basis for the discrimination estimates implies that correct 
specifications of the earning functions are crucial so as not to induce omitted variable bias into 
the estimates. Obviously, discrimination will seem smaller, the more of the wage differential that 
can be explained by productivity differences. Thus one should be careful concerning which 
variables to include in the model specification. Below, the choice of variables and the reasoning 












The dependent variable is the log of the worker's gross wage. The wage variable includes the 
nonnal wage and overtime payment. Gross wages are used as the dependent variable, since 
deductions of a redistributional nature will lead to underestimation of the wage differentiaL 
SALDRU93 data on regular wage employees include self-employed professionals. Cross 
tabulation of occupation and employment status showed that no professionals reported their 
income from self-employment in OHS95. Some respondents defined themselves as semi self-
employed and for this group the dependent variable is defined as gross wage, plus gross income 
from own account activities. (Regarding income from own account activities, actual expenses 
were deducted.) 
Independent Variables 
All discrimination estimates are based on estimated earnings functions. The earnings functions 
include two types of independent variable: data set variables, which are related to the design of 
the survey and should be included to get reliable point estimates and variance estimates; and 
individual variables, both quantitative and qualitative, which contain individual-specific 
infonnation. 
Data Set Variables 
Weights 
Household surveys are often designed to be self-weighting so that the sample reflects the 
popUlation that is surveyed. But often the obtained sample fails to be self-weighting. SALDRU93 
failed to represent the whole population because whites were over-represented as non-
respondents and because some areas could not be surveyed due to the crime situation. In 
situations where the population characteristics are not reflected by the available sample, 
probability weights can be used as a means of correction. Weights are defined according to the 
inverse ofthe probability of being in the sample. Observations that are more likely to be in the 
sample than in the population will be weighted down and vice versa. As an example, white 
observations were weighted up in SALDRU93 since white observations were underrepresented 
in the sample. 
If a sample does not represent the population it is taken from, failing to include weights will 
result in biased point estimates. Probability weights are thus included when estimating mean 
values. Using weights in regressions is a controversial issue, but following Deaton's (1997) 
advice weights are also included in the earnings function regressions. 1 J 
Clusters 
Both SALDRU93 and OHS95 were clustered surveys. When data are collected from clusters 
infonnation is "lost" since neighbouring households are more likely to produce similarities than 
two random households (income, crime rate, number of children, etc.). Observations within 
clusters are therefore not truly independent. Imagine an extreme case where data are gathered 
from an agricultural based cluster in a rural area in a developing country. If so, the marginal 
II " If regressions are primarily descriptive, exploring association by looking at the mean of one variable conditional 












household is not likely to give much additional information (Deaton 1997). Failing to take 
clusters into account will produce variances of the estimated variables that are too small. 
Individual Characteristics 
Education 
To account for education a continuous variable measuring years of education is used. The 
education variable is obtained by transforming information on educational categories into 
number of years of education. An obvious problem using this variable is that access to and 
quality of education are unspecified. Different access to education may be regarded as pre-labour 
market discrimination. However, the quality of education is undoubtedly correlated with a 
worker's productivity, and is therefore likely to be reflected in wage differentials. But measuring 
quality of education is complicated, and the available data sets did not contain potential 
indicators regarding the quality of education (e.g. mean school results in nation-wide, 
standardised examinations). The influence of the quality of education on wages is thus omitted. 
EducatiOll Squared 
A squared term for years of education is included, allowing for the possibility that education's 
influence on wages is nonlinear. 
Experience 
Potential experience is included as another independent variable. Actual experience is hard to 
measure and potential experience is used as a proxy. Potential experience is defined as worker's 
age minus the number of years of schooling and the age when first attending school (Mincer 
1993).12 While the accuracy of this measure can be questioned, it is arguable that simply using 
age itself is the greater of two evils. 
Experience Squared 
A quadratic term for experience is also included in the regression specification. This is to allow 
for increasing and then decreasing returns to experience over the life cycle, as suggested by 
human capital theory. The empirically observed wage-experience profile is illustrated in Figure 1 
(Oaxaca 1973B). Based on this pattern one would expect the coefficient of potential experience 
to be positive and the coefficient of the squared term to be negative. 











FIGURE 2 Wage-Experience Profile 
Wage 
Experience 
Using potential experience as a proxy for actual experience the quantity of experience is likely to 
be overestimated, since temporary retreats from the labour market are not accounted for. Thus the 
peak of the wage-experience profile is unlikely to be accurate. Potential gains from experience 
also depend on other labour market characteristics such as occupational categories. As an 
illustration, one would imagine that a newly employed secretary has less to gain from experience 
compared to an inexperienced trainee manager (Bergmann 1973). Furthermore, any gains from 
experience that are linked, for example, to the quality of education, are unaccounted for. 
For females a more reliable proxy for actual experience could be obtained by adjusting for 
number of children. But SALDRU93 reports number of children only for females younger than 
49 years old. OHS95 reports number of children for females younger than 55 years. I was 
therefore deprived of the option of adjusting for number of children unless I wanted to restrict the 
sample size significantly. 
Another variable that might influence wage earnings is tenure. But information on tenure is not 
available for both data sets and thus this variable has to be excluded. 
Location 
A dummy variable for location is included to test the hypothesis that workers in urban areas earn 
more than those in rural areas. SALDRU93 reports location in three categories: Metropolitan, 
Urban and Rural. Location in a metropolitan area indicates residence in one of the major South 
African cities. In this analysis metropolitan and urban categories are collapsed into one urban 
category. 
Union membership 
A dummy for union membership is included to enable a hypothesis test on whether unionised 
workers earn higher wages than non-unionised employees. SALDRU93 does not include specific 
information on union membership, but paid up union members are recorded and this figure is 












Dummy variables for nine one-digit industrial categories are included. Making industrial 
categories comparable across the two data sets did not involve any major difficulties. 
Occupation 
The earnings functions include dummies for eight one-digit occupational categories, since wages 
are observed to vary substantially among occupations. Occupation may also serve as an 
indication of workers' abilities other than quantifiable variables such as education. Given the 
historical background of South Africa, the occupational distribution reflects past discrimination 
in the way that certain groups were excluded from high earning occupations. The scope of the 
estimations is to determine discrimination in the form of unequal pay for equal work. 
Occupational barriers for certain groups are thus defined as pre-labour market discrimination. 
The occupational breakdown in SALDRU93 is more limited than in the OHS95 survey. Hence 
adjustments to make OHS95 categories congruent with SALDRU93 categories had to be made. 
In 1993 'Professionals, Assosiate-Professionals and Technicians' were treated as one 
occupational category. Thus the more complete breakdown of the OHS95 survey had to be 
collapsed to fit the 1993 data. Similarly, 'Clerical and Sales' occupations were defined as one 
category in 1993 while these occupations were reported separately in 1995. Again 1995 data 
were adjusted to fit 1993 data. A further obstacle was that 'Farming and related' occupations 
from 1993 had changed to 'Skilled Agriculture and Fishery' workers in 1995. No attempt was 
made to adjust for this change and a reduction in the number of workers in agricultural 
occupations from 1993 to 1995 is expected. Further reductions in agricultural occupations imply 
increased numbers in unskilled occupations. In OHS95 army employees were not reported in 
separate occupations. Army workers therefore had to be excluded from the OHS95 sample. 
Province 
Dummies for South Africa's nine provinces are included. Provinces were defined differently in 
1993 and 1995, but based on information about regions, data from 1993 can be transformed to 
match the provincial definition from 1994 onwards. Ideally, information on province of work 
would be preferred to information on province of residence. But data on the former were not 
available for SALDRU93. Province of residence is thus used as a proxy for province of work for 
both data sets. Since data are collected just before and just after the fall of the apartheid regime, 
significant movements between provinces may be expected. 
After running ordinary least squares regressions according to the earnings funtion specifications 
described above, Wald adjusted F -tests for the joint significance of respectively education, 
experience, industry, occupation and province variables were performed. All F-values turned out 













Table 1 shows the weighted estimated mean values for males based on the 1993 and 1995 
samples. It can be seen that the overall nominal mean wage has increased from 1993 to 1995. 
Coloureds and Whites contradict the overall trend by receiving lower nominal mean wages in 
1995 compared to 1993, although the decrease is very small, particularly for Whites. 
The mean number of years of education has increased when measured for all males. The increase 
in years of education is most apparent for Africans, while Coloureds have less education in 1995 
than in 1993, on average. The defmition of the potential experience variable would normally 
imply less potential experience when years of education increase. Still, Table 1 suggests 
increasing potential experience alongside increasing educational levels. A possible explanation 
for this anomaly is differing age distributions for the two years. If the age distribution in 1995 is 
more skewed toward the right than in 1993, the estimated mean values are consistent. 
The urban-rural distribution suggests that approximately 12 per cent more male employees are 
located in urban areas in 1995 compared with 1993. Urbanisation is most noticeable among 
Africans. Coloureds and Asians show increasing concentrations in rural areas. Increasing 
numbers of male workers are organised in unions in 1995 (although the increase is only 3 per 
cent). Coloureds and Asians exhibit contradictive trends vis-a.-vis the overall population. 
The industrial distribution does not change dramatically from 1993 to 1995. A smaller proportion 
of employees in the mining and transport industries is noted, while the wholesale and service 
industries are expanding in terms of their share of wage employment. Mean values for 
occupational categories are more or less constant across the two data sets. As expected, 
agricultural occupations are declining, but the decline is a result of differing occupational 
definitions for the two surveys. In SALDRU93 agricultural occupations include all agricultural 
occupations, while OHS95 includes only skilled agricultural workers. Matching the decline in 
agricultural occupations, an increase in unskilled occupations is observed. 
Provincial dummies reflect province of residence. Since data are collected the years before and 
after the first democratic election, the substantial movements among provinces which are 
observed, may be plausible. Especially prominent are movements out of Mpumalanga and North 
West Province and into Gauteng and Free State - presumably reflecting the geographical 
distribution of jobs. However, the overall means conceal large provincial changes for certain 
racial groups. For example, it seems unlikely that 18 per cent of Whites moved out of the 
Western Cape within a two-year periods, as indicated by the data. Part of the explanation may lie 













































TABLE 2 Estimated Coefficients from tbe All Male Earning Functions 
F = 72 
R-squared = 0.69 
N = 2223 
25 
1995 Male Earnings Regression 
Coef. Std. Err. t P> Dum Int 
-0 . 0 -0.566 
0.007 13.355 0.000 
0.037 14.061 0.000 
0.000 -9.093 0.000 
-0.213 -6 .567 0.000 -0.192 
0.000 Base Case 0.000 
0.108 0.014 7.458 0.000 0.114 
0.000 Base Case 
-0.734 0.045 -16.362 0.000 
-0 .019 0.052 -0.359 0.722 
0.000 Base Case 
0.164 0.048 












0.000 Base Case 
0.041 0.031 
-0.126 0.058 
-0 .170 0.022 



























-0 .374 0.031 -12.168 0.000 
0.006 0.043 0.137 0.892 
0.038 0.045 0.840 0.407 
-0.151 0.061 -2.484 0.018 
0.086 0.037 2.352 0.025 
5.995 0.069 86.994 0.000 
F = 2238 
R-squared = 0.70 
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13 It should be noted that the Wage-Experience profiles reflect only the estimated coefficients for the experience and 
experience squared variables in the earnings functions . The profiles in Figure 4 (and all the other Wage-Experience 
profiles) therefore do not illustrate the returns from potential experience over individual employees' life span, since 











Table 2 displays the results of the all-males weighted earnings regression. Given the semi-
logarithmic form of the earning function, the interpretations of the coefficients are especially 
convenient. The interpretation of the coefficients of the continuous variables is that they measure 
the constant proportional or relative change in the dependent variable for a given absolute change 
in the value of an independent variable l4 (Gujarati 95). 
The estimated coefficients of the dummy variables are also easily interpreted if Halvorsen and 
Palmquist's (1980) rule is applied: "Take the antilog of the estimated dummy coefficient and 
subtract one from it." Applying this rule, the coefficients of the dummy variables express the 
relative change in the mean value of the dependent variable when the value of a dummy variable 
changes from zero to one. Transformed values for the dummy coefficients according to 
Halvorsen and Palmquist's rule are reported in Table 2 in the column labelled "Dum Int." 
The influence of education and potential experience on wages is illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. 
These figures are created by imposing a second order polynomial relation using the estimated 
coefficients for education and education squared, and experience and experience squared, 
respectively, as reported in Table 2. The values of all other variables are kept fixed. Figure 3 
shows that education has positive and increasing marginal returns on wages. The impact of 
education on wages seems to be more or less constant across the two periods, 1993 and 1995. 
Figure 4 relates potential experience to wages in a manner consistent with human capital theory. 
The results reported in Table 2, enable the rejection of the hypothesis that urban and rural 
locations yield identical wages. Rural location results in reduced earnings but the negative impact 
of rural location on earnings is reduced in 1995 compared to 1993. Based on the regression 
results, it can be argued that union members earn more than the non-unionised. The coefficient 
for union members is insignificant (5 per cent level) for the 1993 data, but based on 1995 data 
the coefficient is significant and indicates that union members earn 11 per cent more than non-
unionised employees. 
Using the manufacturing industry as the base case, it is observed that employees in the 
agriculture, wholesale and service industries earn significantly less than employees in the 
manufacturing industry both in 1993 and 1995. Furthermore, wages are lower in the construction 
industry, while employees in electricity and transport industries earn higher wages than in the 
manufacturing industry; however, these three results are statistically significant only in 1995. The 
coefficient for the mining industry dummy changes sign from 1993 (positive) to 1995 (negative), 
but it is insignificant for both years. Both finance industry coefficients are positive but 
insignificant. 
Unskilled occupations were used as the base case and as expected all other occupations earn 
higher incomes, except for agricultural occupations in 1993. The coefficient for the agricultural 
occupational dummy further change sign moving from 1993 to 1995 data. The changing sign can 
again be explained by the new definition of agricultural occupations in 1995. As mentioned 
before agricultural occupations in 1995 included only skilled agricultural workers. It is 
14 An example using a single regression model illustrates this point. 
In(W) = a + JJX <=> W = eG eflX The derivative of In (W) with respect to X equals jJ . 
The derivative of W with respect to X is given by: aw / ax = eG e flX jJ = W jJ 











interesting to note further that in both years the mangerial category returns the highest income -
ceteris paribus - even higher than the professional category. This could be explained by the fact 
that the professional category includes associate professionals and technicians. 
Most of the coefficients for individual provincial dummies are insignificant. It can be noted that 
employees with residential status in the Free State earn less than workers in KwaZulu Natal. The 
1995 regression indicates that Gauteng workers earn 9 per cent more than employees in KwaZulu 
Natal. However, given the potential problems with this variable discussed earlier, not much 
reliance is placed on these results. 
From Table 1 the estimated 15 observed wage differentials between the individual racial groups 
and the overall male mean wage can be computed. Furthermore, the estimated productivity 
component of the wage differential can be derived, based on the coefficients from the all-male 
earnings regression reported in Table 2 and the difference between the overall mean 
characteristics and the mean characteristics of the various races (see equation (29». These results 
are reported in Table 3 below. 
TABLE 3 Decomposition of Male Wage Differentials 
Year 1993 1995 
Race African Coloured Asian White African Coloured Asian White 
r g -0.369 -0.020 0.846 2:960 -0.273 -0.211 0.858 2.390 
Bg -0.325 0.084 0.940 1.913 -0.187 -0.221 0.669 1.297 
5
g 
(Bg + 1) 16 -0.045 -0.105 -0.094 1.047 -0.086 0.011 0.l89 l.093 ., 
5g -0.066 -0.097 -0.'049 0.360 -0.106 0.014 0.113 0.476 
w -w r g = g ~ and expresses group g's mean wage relative to the mean wage of the whole 
W 
sample (all males). Gamma thus defines the gross wage differential. 
~ ~ 
~ W O-Wo 
Bg = g ~ and expresses group g's non-discriminatory mean wage relative to the non-
WO 
discriminatory mean wage of the whole sample. Theta defines the productivity differential. 
5g (Bg + 1) = ~ ~ ~o [~gO J = ~ ~ ~o and shows the difference between group g's mean 
WO WO WO 
g 
wage and non-discriminatory wage relative to the non-discriminatory wage of the whole sample. 
5 g (Bg + 1) therefore illustrates the discrimination differential. Comparing 5 (B + 1) with 5 as g g g 
15 The wage differential is estimated in the sense that mean values are computed for the whole sample and individual 
racial groups. 
W -WO 
16 Bg + 5g (Bg + 1) = g W ° = r g ,assuming W ° = W . 5g (Bg + 1) is thus computed as the difference 











defined by equation (10), we see that the former relates the difference between the mean wage 
and the mean wage in the absence of discrimination to the pooled mean wage, while 5 relates 
g 
the same difference to the mean wage of its own group. 
Table 3 illustrates South Africa's wage ranking where Africans earn the least and Whites the 
most. Respectively Africans, Coloureds, Asians and Whites earn 37 per cent below, 2 per cent 
below, 85 per cent above and 296 per cent above the 1993 mean male monthly wage ofR1128 17• 
Of the African gross wage differential 88 per cent can be explained by productivity differences. 
The remaining 12 per cent of the gross wage differential can be interpreted as discrimination in 
the form of underpayment. Based on productivity characteristics, Coloureds are expected to earn 
more than the average male wage. Thus Coloureds are also subject to underpayment. Table 3 
indicates that Asians are underpaid . Although the Asian mean wage was above the average male 
wage, Asians would have been paid even more in the absence of discrimination, reflecting their 
superior productivity. Whites earn 296 per cent above the male mean wage. Of the White wage 
differential, 65 per cent is due to above average productivity characteristics. The remaining 35 
per cent of the wage differential results from Whites being overpaid. 
Corresponding numbers for 1995 indicate that the wage ranking among races remains unaltered. 
In 1995 Africans earn 27 per cent less than the mean wage ofR1305 . Of the wage differential 
some 68 per cent is explained by productivity differences. Thus the residual, comprising the 
discrimination component, has increased for Africans from 1993 to 1995. The estimations 
suggest that Coloureds earn less compared to the overall mean wage in 1995 than in 1993. But 
different from 1993 is that below average payments are more than explained by (below average) 
productivity characteristics. The data thus suggest that Coloureds are overpaid in 1995. Asians 
and Whites earn respectively 85 per cent and 239 per cent more than the mean male wage. Some 
78 per cent and 54 per cent of the Asian and White wage differential can be related to above 
average productivity characteristics, respectively. 
Comparing the discrimination coefficient 5 g for 1993 and 1995 I find that discrimination is 
declining only in the Coloured group. In relative terms Africans are more extensively underpaid 
in 1995, Whites are overpaid relatively more, and Asians change from being faced by 
underpayment to overpayment. The results thus contradict the argument that in South Africa the 
long term trend has been declining discrimination (Moll 1998, Hinks 1999). On the other hand 
the findings are consistent with previous work based on post apartheid data sets. Hinks and 
Allanson (2000) also fail to find that discrimination is declining for all racial groups utilising the 
OHS95 and OHS97 surveys. 












Estimates for the female sub-sample are produced in the same fashion as for males. The results 
can therefore be interpreted equivalently for both males and females. From Table 4 below it can 
be observed that the overall nominal mean wage has increased from 1993 to 1995. An increase in 
wages is evident for all racial groups. 
The mean number of years of education has increased both for all females and for the respective 
racial groups. As for males, the increase in education is most substantial for Africans. In contrast 
to males, however, females exhibit less potential experience 1995 than in 1993. Decreased 
potential experience is consistent with what one might expect due to the construction of the 
potential experience variable. Asians violate the general trend, having more experience in 1995 
than in 1993. A possible explanation is differing age distributions for Asian females in the two 
years. The data suggest that females in general are also subject to urbanisation and increasing 
union membership. Coloureds and Asians deviate from the overall pattern. 
The industrial distributior_ of employees is more or less constant based on data from 1993 and 
1995. However, in terms of occupational categories a female-specific trend is noticeable, namely 
movements from service occupations into clerk and sales occupations. As for males, a decrease 
in agricultural occupations and an increase in unskilled occupations are observed. A likely 
explanation is the differing definitions of agricultural occupations in the two surveys. 
Considerable movements across provinces are also observed for females. The main tendencies 
are similar for both genders, in that the figures in Table 4 indicate movements out of 
Mpumalanga and North West Province and into Gauteng and Free State. As before, certain 
reservations about the reliability of these figures are pertinent. 
Table 5 displays the results from the pooled female weighted earnings regression. The influence 
of education and potential experience on wages is illustrated in Figures 5 and 6, respectively. As 
for males, a second order polynomial relationship between wages and education/experience is 
imposed, using the estimated coefficients from the earnings functions and disregarding all other 
estimated values. From Figure 5 it is seen that earnings are positively related to years of 
education. Furthermore, marginal returns to education are increasing. The wage-experience 
profile exhibits similar patterns to those suggested by human capital theory. 
Rural location reduces earning by 28 per cent in 1993 and 16 per cent in 1995. Union 
membership has a positive influence on earnings. In 1993 union membership increased monthly 
earnings by 29 per cent while this figure was reduced to 14 per cent in 1995. 
Among industrial categories estimations suggest that workers in the primary, mining, wholesale, 
and service industries eaf'l less than those in the manufacturing industry. Workers in electricity, 
transport and finance industries earn more than manufacturing workers. However, some of the 
coefficients are not statistically significant, most notably for the mining sector. The coeffiCient 
for the construction industry changes sign from 1993 to 1995, but this coefficient is insignificant 











TABLE 4 Weighted Mean Values for the Variables Included in the Female Earning Functions 
1995 Mean Values 
Variable Name Code <" .:<4AII "".:JIAfrlcan ,,:,i~olo"'ired ,·Aslan , White '",., All African Coloured Asian White 
Log Gross Mth Wage Inwage ':'~<" 6~646 '~;2U ;'-'~ rr29 7;,1 59: ;?;7~9 7,170 6,932 6 ,907 7,504 7,831 
Years of Education yrsed : ·t" 8i438 .: ·':S .4()3 :;- !,~8 ;,190 10,899 . 1 !1'~~87 10,097 9,300 9,220 11 ,146 12,313 
." ',! • :,,: •• ".. : ...... ' " .. 
Years of Ed Squared yrsedsq ; • \B9;11 1 :;;~72~~~1' ,';(7~~616 127:.015 13.~,447 116,216 103,786 95,420 132,434 154,787 
•• :- '-'. L'.-, ,.,t"} ..•.•• ~~~ ... ':' ... ~~~ 
.. 1'4;86'4 > . P. Work Experience exp :":;~~0:681 r : ~~i~~P ·, '_r~J~;g?6 17.4.64 19,726 21 ,557 17,257 15,492 17,415 
P. Work Exp Squared expsq ;'5568~258 ' ·:· 654~503 · A47S'003 360;448 . . 437\3'58 520,303 594,778 409,062 350,876 431,862 "':. . .... ':." ... ; ... :.,.. '.' .• ~! f .' . -",. 
Rural locdum1 ' ': 10;a9l ~-:0 ;602 '::;:;l:iP~~ 22 .,OiO!l 1 . :',(};081 0,257 0,384 0,147 0,035 0,052 
" :,,0~6d9 ' '7io~398 :'fioi878 .;,':! -, ~~ -' . '0 :9"19: Urban locdum2 
.. ' ~;_;.' ",,-,,: '",* .:t :.")'i-~:, "( .• " .. :'j.:~ .... • 0",98.9 <' . , , 0,743 0,616 0,853 0,965 0,948 
Member uniond1 1',' 0"23'1",. ; .. " lt0 206 ;::.~O .'~36 ' 0 ~·H6 ::· ~O,Q93 0,315 0 ,374 0,295 0,361 0,177 .:'~~_ t ",· ""_";,:,' ;,i .(";."~'':t'. ;:-"'"$.1.: :: , .... ~ .. 
-6~584 :~'" 
,,/"" 
Not Member uniond2 I~' ";;:,;0~769 . 'fJO:794 <i~' :)b~5'64 GO~907 0,685 0,626 0,705 0,639 0,823 
Ag ric/F ish/F oresUH u nt inddum1 ,~. ,)0;166,.,., ,;;:0,137'. >', t:Q;134 0;000 •. :~~,O17 0,087 0 ,114 0 ,141 0,004 0,006 
"'~ .:,,,,: .. ~~.~-:: ".: ''':'~''1:~'~' .,df~~;·~~-~ x.~ _ ~ 
Mining/Quarrying inddum2 "" O.QPS/ ;<. ) lQ.OQ.7 ,;: .: ~:9',OOO , 0,000 .': ::;0;021 0,008 0,009 0,000 0,011 0,010 
~ 0;~ ·5~ ·. ,@;1:3'1 .·:~, : Jef 268 ~,'If .("""-.. f:.: J6'05.4 Manufacturing inddum3 . ~~~49 ~~, 0,154 0,143 0,245 0,336 0,101 ".#~ _> ~ " ;~':~:~~ -. ~ '£,~ .. ~:.,~~ ,>,~;: ·:~~~j:r'''"·f ~ . .." ,, '. -. 
Electricity inddum4 ' '';IO,~0t'::, .. ·:IP ;09J,.~j',:;~O.J000, '0;0:, 1' . ,iO,O,1ti' 0,005 0,003 0,003 0,000 0 ,011 
inddum5 ' . ;0)012 ' ,;?iD O:U" <i:~O'012 . '. . ~ .. .. 10;0'16' Construction ... t ,; ,""_, ': '. ._. :<._, t .:' :" ", .. :: .. ,' :,' ' : ., ' Oj01 1, 0,008 0,004 0,004 0,013 0,019 
Wholesale inddum6 :0:162 ;·;()'. t3'1, ': O~.219' 0;135 ' , (J,213 0 ,224 0,217 0,267 0,205 0,220 
Transort inddum7 ,,0;032 " :~0020 - ;.~ 01'2 , 0,01'11, ,iO,09'1l 0,013 0,007 0 ,007 0,021 0,028 .. -; _ ., .t .. ... , ' , 
Finance inddum8 ·'0;04.5, "t'HHs ,0,0'12 0,056 ;~O , 1S7 0,097 0,044 0,061 0,123 0,238 . .'~ '. t . 
Service inddum9 :0\477 ... ;0,541: ;;0;343 ,' 0';326 , '0 ,4,15 0,404 0,458 0,271 0,285 0 ,367 
Professional occdum1 '(\),176' '- 0,1&6 ,,1-(j,131 0;180 '0,242 0,246 0,256 0,114 0,245 0,294 
Manager occdum2 " 0,047 :' 0:;005 ( 0;0.08 0,0'34 ' 0,204 0,017 0 ,010 0,011 0,018 0 ,038 
Clerk & Sale occdum3 ,0';205 :; 0 ;105 :,,0;201 0,405 " ' 0,454- 0,323 0,209 0,294 0,439 0,591 
Service occdum4 0,209 ;,,0,315 ·,0,038 0,056 0,069 0 ,086 0,100 0,119 0,024 0 ,045 
Agriculture occdum5 :0;043 ::0,072 ' ;0,004 0.,000 . .:e).;OOD 0 ,002 0,002 0,004 0,000 0,000 
Craft & Trade occdum6 0,015 ~O,OO9 , 0,0,23 0,056 ' 0,013 0,029 0,032 0,042 0,065 0,009 
Skilled Worker occdum7 0,098 ' 0,084 0,210 0,258 "0;010 0,058 0,060 0,107 0,157 0,011 
Unskilled Worker occdum8 0,208 0,243 · 0,38'5 0,011 0;008 0,239 0,331 0,308 0,052 0,011 
Western Cape provdum1 0,207 0',045 0,745., 0',000 0,305. 0,135 0,027 0,661 0,024 0,121 
Northern Cape provdum2 0,,013 0,004 0,061 0,000 0,000 0,012 0,005 0,039 0,000 0,016 
Eastern Cape provdum3 0.,098" 0', t 20. 0,075' 0;000' 0,075 0.113 0 ,144 0,086 0,016 0,069 
KwaZulu/Natal provdum4 0;,189 0',180 ,0',1'06, 0,989 0,011 0,187 0,214 0,046 0,770 0 ,104 
Free State provdum5 tr,013 O,,021~ O ~OOO: 0,000 0,000, 0 ,056 0 ,069 0 ,015 0,000 0,056 
Mpumalanga provdum6 01,1'31: 0,1'86 
a 
O,OO~ 0,01 1: O,;1(i):3 0 ,046 0,064 0,004 0,003 0,034 
Northern Province provdum7 'Q,084 0,114 0,000- 0,0'0.0 Q,O&7 0,057 0,087 0,011 0,000 0,018 
0,071 0,097 0,009 0 ,003 0,053 
0,324 0 ,294 0,131 0,183 0,528 
































F = 95.24 
R-squared = 0.70 
N = 1570 
-4.136 0.000 
-0.087 O.93~ 
1995 Female Earnings Regression 
Coef. Std. Err. t Dum Int 
0.026 0.009 2.728 0.010 
0.004 0.001 7.698 0.000 
0.025 0.003 9.086 0.000 
0.000 0.000 -4.320 0.000 
-0.177 0.022 -8.201 0.000 -0.162 
0.000 Base Case 0.000 
0.133 0.015 8.658 0.000 0.142 
0.000 Base Case 0.000 
-0.611 0.059 -10.326 0.000 -0.457 
-0.012 0.168 -0.070 0.945 -0.012 














0.000 Base Case 
0.000 
1.630 0.113 0.165 
0.424 0.675 0.060 
-7.834 0.000 -0.225 
0.446 0.659 0.040 
3.878 0.000 0.130 
-1 .036 0.308 -0.033 








































































FIGURE 5 Female Wage-Education Profile 
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Defining unskilled occupations as the base case, it is observed that almost all other occupations 
yield higher earnings. The exception is agricultural occupations in 1993 . This coefficient further 
changes sign from 1993 (negative) to 1995 (positive), which again can be explained by the fact 
that agricultural occupations included only skilled workers in 1995 while all agricultural workers 
were included in 1995. 
Most of the individual dummy variables for provinces are insignificant. Only the coefficient for 
Gauteng is significant for both years; the positive sign indicates that residents of Gauteng enjoy 
higher earnings, on average. 
Based on the estimated mean values in Table 5, the observed wage differential between each 
racial group and the whole sample of females can be determined. Using the regression 
coefficients for all females and the differences in mean values between each racial group and the 
entire female workforce, the productivity component of the observed wage differential can be 
estimated. These results are presented in Table 7. 
TABLE 6 Decomposition of Female Wage Differentials 
Year 1993 1995 
Race African Coloured Asian White African Coloured Asian White 
Yg -0.352 0.086 0.670 1.984 -0.212 -0.231 0.396 0.936 
{}g -0.304 0.087 0.659 1.410 -0.143 -0.232 0.246 0.617 
6g ({}g + 1) -0.049 -0.001 0.011 0.574 -0.069 0.002 0.150 0.319 
6g -0.070 -0.001 0.007 0.238 -0.080 0.002 0.121 0.197 
The 1993 results support tae notion of a South African wage hierarchy where Whites earn the 
most and Africans the least. Similar figures for 1995 indicate that the wage ranking has changed. 
From 1993 to 1995 Coloureds and Africans swapped places in the wage hierarchy with 
Coloureds now earning the least. In 1993, respectively Africans, Coloureds, Asians and Whites 
earned 35 per cent less, and 8.6 per cent, 67 per cent and 198 per cent above an average monthly 
wage ofR770.18 For Africans 86 per cent of the wage differential can be explained by below 
average productivity characteristics while the remaining component potentially reflects 
discrimination. Productivity characteristics explain almost fully the observed wage differential 
for Coloureds and Asians. For Whites, productivity characteristics explain roughly 71 percent of 
the wage differential. 
Moving to 1995, Africans, Coloureds, Asians and Whites earned respectively 21 per cent less, 23 
per cent less, 40 per cent more and 94 per cent more than an average monthly wage ofR1300.19 
The components of the wage differentials explained by productivity characteristics were 
respectively for Africans, Coloureds, Asians and Whites some 67 per cent, 100 per cent, 62 per 
cent and 66 per cent. 











Based on the estimations, Whites are the only group where the unexplained component of the 
wage differential is decreasing. Thus it is only on behalf of Whites it can argued that 
discrimination is declining. For the other racial groups discrimination is potentially increasing. 
This fact is reflected in the values for the discrimination coefficient ( 0 g) for the two years. The 
difference of the absolute value of the discrimination coefficient from 1995 to 1993 is negative 












In most academic work the results obtained hinge to an important degree on underlying 
assumptions. The present paper is no exception to this rule. Important assumptions will thus be 
summarised before major findings are pointed out. 
The focus has been on discrimination among full time wage earning employees. Other forms of 
discrimination, labelled pre-labour market discrimination, have at best been controlled for (e.g. 
dummy variables for occupational categories) and at worst not controlled for owing to lack of 
data (e.g. quality of education). Further, the applied decomposition method estimates 
discrimination as a residual between observed wage differentials and the wage component 
explained by productivity characteristics. Misspecification of the earnings functions will thus 
induce bias into the discrimination estimates. A more fundamental assumption is that the 
presence of discrimination has only distributional effects. In other words, the wage bill is 
regarded as constant whether discrimination is present or not. In addition, to make discrimination 
estimates operational, one needs a notion of what the wage structure would be like in the absence 
of discrimination. In the present paper, average characteristics based on a pooled sample20 
containing all racial groups is used as a proxy for the non-discriminatory wage structure. Lastly, 
certain ad hoc assumptions were unavoidable when attempting to make data from 1993 
congruent with data from 1995. 
African males were subject to discrimination in the form of underpayment in both 1993 and 
1995. However, the largest share of the observed wage differential for this group was due to 
below average productivity characteristics. For Coloured and Asian males, substantial wage 
differentials were mostly explained by above or below average productivity characteristics 
(relative to the average male worker). An exception was found for Asian males in 1995, in whose 
case above average productivity characteristics accounted for some 78 per cent of the observed 
wage differential. Based on discrimination coefficients, it was found that discrimination was 
most remarkable towards white males. Whites are overpaid, illustrated by the fact that in 1993 
and 1995, productivity characteristics could explain no more than approximately 65 per cent and 
54 per cent ofthe observed wage differential, respectively. 
Among females, discrimination exhibits similar patterns to those found for males. Differing 
productivity compared to the average female worker explains by far the greatest part of the 
observed wage differentials for Africans, Coloureds and Asians. But productivity as the 
explanatory force is not as predominant among Africans as among Coloureds and Asians. The 
results for Asian females in 1995 are an exception. In 1995 Asian productivity accounted for only 
62 per cent of the wage differential. Again, the data suggest that the most striking discriminatory 
effect is defined by White overpayment. For White females, above average productivity 
characteristics account for 71 per cent and 66 per cent of the wage differential in 1993 and 1995, 
respectively. 
In sum, using data from 1993 and 1995, variation in discrimination trends among racial groups 
seems to be the rule. At the least, I cannot conclude that discrimination is declining as an overall 
trend for all racial groups. But what do the differences when comparing the 1993 results with the 
1995 results really reflect? Two possible explanations seem plausible: the differences reflect 
either changes over time or data inconsistencies. Ifthe time span of two years is too short to pick 











up considerable changes in the underlying wage structure, then variation in discriminatory 
trends probably reflects data inconsistencies. A more likely scenario is that changing 
discrimination coefficients incorporate both changes over time and problems with the data. 
Unfortunately, it is not clear how to separate these effects. Despite these problems, one finding 
stands out, namely that Whites are overpaid relative to their measured productivity. However, 
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The appendix contains regression results for individual racial groups. Tables AI-A4 state the estimated 
regression coefficients for the four male racial groups. Figures Al and A2 illustrate the male wage-
education profiles for the years 1993 and 1995. Figures A3 and A4 show the wage-experience patterns 
in 1993 and 1995. The remaining tables and figures contain the same kind of infonnation as described 
above, but for females. Based on the estimates in this appendix bilateral discrimination coefficients, as 
described in Section 2, can be estimated. 







locdum2 0,000 Base case 0,000 
uniond1 0,196 0,Q18 11,116 0,000 0,217 
uniond2 0,000 Base case 0,000 
inddum1 -0,821 0,053 -15,468 0,000 -0,560 
inddum2 -0,052 0,051 -1,026 0,313 -0,051 
inddum3 0,000 Base case 0,000 
inddum4 0,204 0,060 3,395 0,002 0,227 
inddum5 -0,149 0,041 -3,665 0,001 -0,138 
inddum6 -0,189 0,028 -6,832 0,000 -0,172 
inddum7 0,066 0,031 2,150 0,039 0,068 
inddum8 -0,054 0,039 -1,371 0,180 -0,052 
inddum9 0,000 0,030 0,004 0,997 0,000 
occdum1 0,562 0,047 11 ,957 0,000 0,754 
occdum2 0,740 0,101 7,335 0,000 1,096 
occdum3 0,292 0,022 13,226 0,000 0,340 
occdum4 0,346 0,031 10,993 0,000 0,414 
occdum5 0,405 0,160 2,527 0,017 0,500 
occdum6 0,302 0,030 10,137 0,000 0,352 
occdum7 0,251 0,018 13,631 0,000 0,285 
occdum8 0,000 Base case 0,000 
provdum1 0,023 0,044 0,528 0,601 0,024 
provdum2 -0,154 0,115 -1,341 0,189 -0,143 
provdum3 -0,183 0,040 -4,516 0,000 -0,167 
provdum4 0,000 Base case 0,000 
provdum5 -0,392 0,039 -10,104 0,000 -0,325 
provdum6 -0,014 0,046 -0,300 0,766 -0,014 
provdum7 0,072 0,062 1,155 0,257 0,074 
provdum8 -0,151 0,070 -2,164 0,038 -0,140 
provdum9 0,017 0,041 0,420 0,677 0,017 
cons 6,099 0,059 103,016 0,000 
F=32.79 F=1482.75 












TABLEA2 Estimated Coefficients from the Coloured Male Earning Functions 
1995 Coloured Male Earnings Regression 




locdum1 -0,170 0,086 -0,156 
locdum2 0,000 Base Case 0,000 
uniond1 0,185 0,031 5,955 0,000 0,203 
uniond2 0,000 Base Case 0,000 
inddum1 -0,420 0,097 -4,316 0,000 -0,343 
inddum2 0,078 0,186 0,416 0,681 0,081 
inddum3 0,000 Base Case 0,000 
inddum4 0,236 0,128 1,851 0,077 0,266 
inddum5 -0,183 0,051 -3,588 0,001 -0,167 
inddum6 -0,121 0,037 -3,309 0,003 -0,114 
inddum7 0,061 0,086 0,715 0,482 0,063 
inddum8 -0,100 0,060 -1,655 0,111 -0,095 
inddum9 -0,022 0,045 -0,479 0,637 -0,021 
occdum1 0,774 0,077 10,050 0,000 1,169 
0,713 0,113 6,291 0,000 1,039 
0,385 0,080 4,787 0,000 0,469 
0,435 0,044 9,882 0,000 0,545 
0,493 0,284 1,735 0,096 0,638 
0,364 0,059 6,225 0,000 0,439 
occdum7 0,296 0,043 6,899 0,000 0,345 
0,000 Base Case 0,000 
provdum1 -0,271 0,088 -3,092 0,005 -0,238 
provdum2 -0,511 0,125 -4,092 0,000 -0,400 
provdum3 -0,426 0,084 -5,077 0,000 -0,347 
provdum4 0,000 Base Case 0,000 
provdum5 -0,572 0,195 -2,928 0,007 -0,436 
provdum6 0,077 0,222 0,344 0,734 0,080 
provdum7 0,159 0,171 0,931 0,361 0,173 
provdum8 -0,326 0,155 -2,105 0,046 -0,278 
provdum9 0,129 0,096 1,350 0,189 0,138 














TABLEA3 Estimated Coefficients from the Asian Male Earning Functions 
1995 Asian Male Earnings Regression 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t Dum Int 
yrsed -0,001 0,074 -0,009 
yrsedsq 0,007 0,003 2,233 0,036 
exp 0,055 0,007 7,985 0,000 
expsq -0,001 0,000 -4,245 0,000 
locdum1 -0,385 0,092 -4,178 0,000 -0,319 
locdum2 0,000 Base case 0,000 
uniond1 0,062 0,049 1,271 0,216 0,064 
uniond2 0,000 Base case 0,000 
inddum1 -0,184 0,255 -0,721 0,478 -0,168 
inddum2 -0,405 0,147 -2,767 0,011 -0,333 
inddum3 0,000 Base case 0,000 
inddum4 0,267 0,126 2,119 0,045 0,307 
inddum5 -0,113 0,124 -0,912 0,371 -0,107 
inddum6 -0,134 0,063 -2,118 0,045 -0,125 
inddum7 0,131 0,069 1,889 0,072 0,140 
inddum8 -0,032 0,084 -0,386 0,703 -0,032 
inddum9 -0,055 0,078 -0,704 0,488 -0,053 
ocajum1 0,382 0,113 3,377 0,003 0,465 
ocajum2 0,485 0,123 3,953 0,001 0,624 
ocajum3 0,167 0,082 2,042 0,053 0,181 
ocajum4 0,198 0,132 1,493 0,149 0,219 
ocajum5 0,891 0,286 3,120 0,005 1,437 
ocajum6 0,141 0,072 1,945 0,064 0,151 
ocajum7 0,096 0,085 1,135 0,268 0,101 
ocajum8 0,000 Base case 0,000 
provdum1 -0,310 0,136 -2,269 0,033 -0,266 
provdum2 -0,486 0,049 -9,976 0,000 -0,385 
provdum3 -0,122 0,169 -0,721 0,478 -0,115 
provdum4 0,000 Base case 0,000 
provdum5 0,000 No Obs 0,000 
provdum6 0,451 0,174 2,585 0,017 0,570 
provdum7 0,000 No Obs 0,000 
provdum8 0,243 0,120 2,018 0,055 0,275 
provdum9 0,207 0,088 2,338 0,028 0,229 














TABLE A4 Estimated Coefficients from the White Male Earning Functions 
1995 White Male Earnings Regression 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t Dum Int 
yrsed 0,143 0,096 1,494 0,148 
yrsedsq -0,001 0,004 -0,365 0,718 
exp 0,071 0,005 13,920 0,000 
expsq -0,001 0,000 -12,508 0,000 
locdum1 0,004 0,078 0,058 0,954 0,004 
locdum2 0,000 Base case 0,000 
uniond1 0,112 0,041 2,751 0,Q11 0,119 
uniond2 0,000 Base case 0,000 
inddum1 -0,283 0,120 -2,350 0,027 -0,246 
inddum2 0,111 0,080 1,385 0,178 0,118 
inddum3 0,000 Base case 0,000 
inddum4 0,034 0,065 0,523 0,605 0,035 
inddum5 -0,062 0,067 -0,918 0,367 -0,060 
inddum6 -0,197 0,040 -4,922 0,000 -0,179 
inddum7 0,045 0,080 0,566 0,576 0,046 
inddum8 0,048 0,042 1,136 0,267 0,049 
inddum9 -0,072 0,024 -2,977 0,006 -0,069 
occdum1 0,601 0,143 4,194 0,000 0,824 
occdum2 0,796 0,152 5,248 0,000 1,217 
occdum3 0,305 0,137 2,217 0,036 0,356 
occdum4 0,286 0,123 2,326 0,028 0,330 
occdum5 0,513 0,236 2,171 0,040 0,670 
occdum6 0,427 0,111 3,855 0,001 0,532 
occdum7 0,254 0,117 2,172 0,040 0,289 
occdum8 0,000 Base case 0,000 
provdum1 -0,097 0,056 -1,723 0,097 -0,093 
provdum2 -0,175 0,072 -2,443 0,022 -0,161 
provdum3 -0,129 0,059 -2,174 0,039 -0,121 
provdum4 0,000 Base case 0,000 
provdum5 -0,122 0,065 -1 ,874 0,073 -0,114 
provdum6 0,074 0,052 1,421 0,168 0,077 
provdum7 -0,087 0,100 -0,871 0,392 -0,083 
provdum8 0,058 0,068 0,846 0,406 0,060 
provdum9 0,125 0,044 2,808 0,010 0,133 
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TABLE AS Estimated Coefficients from the African Female Earning Functions 
1995 African Female Earnings Regression 
Variable Coof. Std. Err. t Dum Int 
yrsed 0,020 0,009 2,290 0,029 
yrsedsq 0,004 0,001 7,034 0,000 
exp 0,023 0,004 5,641 0,000 
expsq 0,000 0,000 -2,809 0,008 
locdum1 -0,122 0,032 -3,801 0,001 -0,115 
locdum2 0,000 Base case 0,000 
uniond1 0,203 0,023 8,921 0,000 0,225 
uniond2 0,000 Base case 0,000 
inddum1 -0,615 0,080 -7,694 0,000 -0,459 
inddum2 -0,064 0,205 -0,312 0,757 -0,062 
inddum3 0,000 Base case 0,000 
inddum4 0,212 0,161 1,315 0,198 0,236 
inddum5 0,097 0,191 0,506 0,616 0,101 
inddum6 -0,143 0,046 -3,145 0,004 -0,133 
inddum7 0,113 0,102 1,107 0,277 0,119 
inddum8 0,179 0,054 3,323 0,002 0,197 
inddum9 0,094 0,045 2,081 0,046 0,098 
occdum1 0,644 0,032 20,434 0,000 0,905 
occdum2 0,583 0,153 3,798 0,001 0,791 
occdum3 0,330 0,036 9,295 0,000 0,391 
occdum4 0,083 0,050 1,663 0,106 0,087 
occdum5 -0,179 0,246 -0,728 0,472 -0,164 
occdum6 -0,002 0,095 -0,017 0,987 -0,002 
occdum7 0,166 0,048 3,475 0,001 0,180 
occdum8 0,000 Base case 0,000 
provdum1 0,009 0,069 0,130 0,898 0,009 
provdum2 -0,277 0,093 -2,991 0,005 -0,242 
provdum3 -0,119 0,042 -2,827 0,008 -0,112 
provdum4 0,000 Base case 0,000 
provdum5 -0,488 0,062 -7,840 0,000 -0,386 
provdum6 -0,024 0,057 -0,423 0,675 -0,024 
provdum7 0,002 0,047 0,044 0,965 0,002 
provdum8 -0,054 0,054 -1,004 0,323 -0,052 
provdum9 0,151 0,042 3,591 0,001 0,163 














TABLEA6 Estimated Coefficients from the Coloured Female Earning Functions 
1995 Coloured Female Earnings Regression 
Coef. Std. Err. t Dum Int 
0,009 0,022 0,414 0,683 
0,004 0,002 2,390 0,026 
exp 0,030 0,006 5,281 0,000 
expsq 0,000 0,000 -3,358 0,003 
locdum1 -0,256 0,071 -3,638 0,002 -0,226 
0,000 Base case 0,000 
uniond1 0,214 0,043 4,972 0,000 0,238 
0,000 Base case 0,000 
-0,498 0,072 -6,870 0,000 -0,392 
0,554 0,093 5,971 0,000 0,739 
0,000 Base case 0,000 
-0,023 0,205 -0,112 0,912 -0,023 
0,112 0,085 1,328 0,199 0,119 
-0,281 0,043 -6,544 0,000 -0,245 
inddum7 0,191 0,113 1,694 0,105 0,211 
0,155 0,072 2,137 0,045 0,167 
-0,133 0,054 -2,433 0,024 -0,124 
0,781 0,118 6,623 0,000 1,184 
0,813 0,119 6,855 0,000 1,254 
0,328 0,041 7,975 0,000 0,388 
0,232 0,079 2,942 0,008 0,261 
0,696 0,117 5,955 0,000 1,005 
0,108 0,081 1,331 0,198 0,114 
0,133 0,048 2,784 0,011 0,143 
0,000 Base case 0,000 
-0,265 0,070 -3,811 0,001 -0,233 
-0,586 0,083 -7,045 0,000 -0,443 
-0,311 0,078 -3,991 0,001 -0,267 
0,000 Base case 0,000 
-0,343 0,161 -2,127 0,045 -0,290 
-0,210 0,104 -2,017 0,057 -0,189 
-0,303 0,099 -3,069 0,006 -0,261 
-0,245 0,084 -2,926 0,008 -0,217 
0,098 0,080 1,218 0,237 0,103 














TABLEA7 Estimated Coefficients from the Asian Female Earning Functions 
1995 Asian Female Earnings Regression 
Variable . Err. t P> Dum In! 
yrsed 0,037 0,387 0,702 
yrsedsq 0,002 2,798 0,010 
exp 0,009 4,916 0,000 
expsq 0,000 -3,367 0,003 
locdum1 0,040 -5,122 0,000 -0,187 
locdum2 0,000 Base case 0,000 
uniond1 0,111 0,037 3,034 0,006 0,117 
uniond2 0,000 Base case 0,000 
inddum1 0,216 0,088 2,451 0,022 0,241 
inddum2 -0,385 0,134 -2,874 0,009 -0,320 
inddum3 0,000 Base case 0,000 
inddum4 0,000 No Obs 0,000 
inddum5 -0,365 0,201 -1 ,822 0,082 -0,306 
inddum6 -0 ,098 0,096 -1,018 0,319 -0,093 
inddum7 0,399 0,287 1,389 0,178 0,491 
inddum8 0,078 0,157 0,493 0,627 0,081 
inddum9 0,021 0,117 0,178 0,861 0,021 
occdum1 0,357 0,144 2,489 0,020 0,429 
occdum2 0,251 0,238 1,053 0,303 0,285 
occdum3 0,089 0,091 0,987 0,334 0,094 
occdum4 -0,011 0,232 -0,047 0,963 -0,011 
occdum5 0,000 No Obs 0,000 
occdum6 -0,055 0,085 -0,646 0,525 -0,053 
occdum7 -0 ,109 0,099 -1,092 0,286 -0,103 
occdum8 0,000 Base case 0,000 
provdum1 -0,119 0,125 -0,952 0,351 -0,112 
provdum2 -0,513 0,144 -3,569 0,002 -0,401 
provdum3 0,282 0,133 2,124 0,045 0,325 
provdum4 0,000 Base case 0,000 
provdum5 0,000 No Obs 0,000 
provdum6 0,176 0,313 0,564 0,579 0,193 
provdum7 0,000 No Obs 0,000 
provdum8 -0,086 0,122 -0,701 0,491 -0,082 
provdum9 0,237 0,059 4,046 0,001 0,267 





















locdum2 0,000 Base case 0,000 
uniond1 0,129 0,043 2,983 0,006 0,137 
uniond2 0,000 Base case 0,000 
inddum1 -0,118 0,118 -1,006 0,324 -0,112 
inddum2 0,067 0,153 0,438 0,665 0,069 
inddum3 0,000 Base case 0,000 
inddum4 0,037 0,118 0,317 0,754 0,038 
inddum5 -0,115 0,178 -0,649 0,522 -0,109 
inddum6 -0,255 0,055 -4,593 0,000 -0,225 
inddum7 -0,232 0,125 -1,859 0,075 -0,207 
inddum8 -0,061 0,061 -0,999 0,327 -0,059 
inddum9 -0,150 0,046 -3,303 0,003 -0,140 
occdum1 0,612 0,205 2,985 0,006 0,844 
occdum2 0,711 0,187 3,811 0,001 1,036 
occdum3 0,431 0,226 1,909 0,068 0,539 
occdum4 0,340 0,229 1,483 0,151 0,405 
occdum5 0,000 No Obs 0,000 
occdum6 0,225 0,152 1,479 0,152 0,253 
occdum7 0,228 0,348 0,655 0,519 0,256 
occdum8 0,000 Base case 0,000 
provdum1 0,020 0,057 0,348 0,731 0,020 
provdum2 -0,116 0,057 -2,019 0,054 -0,109 
provdum3 -0,115 0,055 -2,073 0,049 -0,108 
provdum4 0,000 Base case 0,000 
provdum5 -0,024 0,046 -0,518 0,609 -0,023 
provdum6 -0,046 0,105 -0,441 0,663 -0,045 
provdum7 -0,025 0,063 -0,400 0,693 -0,025 
provdum8 -0,058 0,091 -0,639 0,529 -0,057 
provdum9 0,195 0,064 3,057 0,005 0,215 
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